The West's Wrongheaded View of War
Even if war is naturally part of a state's behavior, it is in its interest to try to avoid it.
The war in Ukraine has given many Western analysts a serious reality check. It is obvious now that Russia’s economic, political and military strengths have been completely underestimated.
But the Western dilemma in its policy towards Russia can also be explained more generally by a completely wrongheaded approach regarding the concept of war itself. For decades the Western political and military elites considered, erroneously, that war had disappeared - at least from their continent-, but at the same time they curiously lost any respect for war and its tragic consequences. It should be obvious that the exact opposite approach is necessary: namely, to accept that war is a natural instrument for a state, but that it should be used as sparingly as possible. Also, it is fundamental to always maintain a deep respect for war and its consequences, not for altruistic reasons, but out of self-interest.
Remembering Clausewitz
Such an approach means a return to the realism of Carl von Clausewitz’s classic On War. The Prussian military theorist famously wrote that : “War is nothing but a continuation of politics with the admixture of other means”. Though this observation may seem strange or even shocking to modern Western ears, it is the role war has mostly had throughout History.
Clausewitz served in the Russian army during the Napoleonic war of 1812 and his influence in Russia is felt to this day. Indeed, Russia’s approach to the war in Ukraine has the imprint of Clausewitz in the sense that it sees military action as a political instrument, along with other such instruments, such as diplomatic and economic ones.
This helps to explain why Russia has been misunderstood in Western political and intellectual circles as the Ukraine crisis has slowly escalated. Since the end of the Cold War, Western elites have come to equate war with the particular military doctrine of the United States, for which, contrary to Clausewitz, war only starts where politics ends, or even worse: when war of aggression is the preferred means to reach geopolitical and commercial ends, often at the exclusion of any good faith diplomacy (the Western parties’ role in the negotiations at Rambouillet in 1998 between NATO and Serbia come to mind, as well as the Minsk “agreements”).
Washington’s wars in the Middle East are typical examples of this behavior. The consequences of these wars have of course been disastrous for the victim states, but they have also been negative for the United States, in terms of an increased militarism in society and an exploding US national debt. The official objectives of these wars, such as “spreading democracy”, have never really been achieved. This is not surprising since such efforts were halfhearted at best. Instead, the Military-Industrial Complex has profited massively from these wars, which strongly suggests that the real goals of the US government are not the official ones.
Avoiding War
For Clausewitz, writing in a time when crony capitalism hardly existed, there is a fundamental interest in avoiding war, because war harms all parties directly involved. Even the victor, when a clear victor can even be defined, must bear costs. Thus, war should always be the last resort employed by states when trying to reach political goals, not only because of the loss of life and the destruction of property that war entails (which a moral state should abhor), but also because of the uncertainty of war for all involved. As the old saying goes, it is easy to start a war, but difficult to end it.
When war does erupt, it is thus often the result of one side’s error of judgment with regard to its own and its opponent’s capabilities and intentions. As the historian Carroll Quigley wrote in his magnum opus, Tragedy and Hope: “This is the chief function of war: to demonstrate as conclusively as possible to mistaken minds that they are mistaken in regard to power relationships.” [i]
If the losing party of a war had properly understood its outcome beforehand, if it were rational, it would have done what was necessary to avoid it, even if that meant painful concessions to a stronger rival. Many historical examples come to mind which fit this description, e.g. Germany’s misjudgement in WWI and Japan’s in WWII. Today, the West’s underestimation of Russia, and the Ukrainian and Western governments’ pigheadedness in pursuing a losing campaign at great cost, are also glaring examples of Quigley’s insight.
Never Delight in War
Since the decision to go to war has serious and unpredictable consequences, it should not be taken lightly, but reluctantly. Thus, the wisdom in George Santayana’s words: “To delight in war is a merit in the soldier, a dangerous quality in the captain, and a positive crime in the statesman.” [ii] Unfortunately, several recent Western leaders, from US President Bush with the war in Afghanistan, to UK Prime Minister Tony Blair with the war in Iraq, and French President Sarkozy with the war in Libya, have confirmed this quote from Santayana by their reckless and callous disregard for the consequences of military action. These wars have lead to hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths and tens of millions of displaced people. It is nothing less than outrageous that there are no consequences for such behavior, not even in the polls.
In this time of global turmoil as the sun sets on the centuries old Western domination, there are clearly lessons to be learned. The stinging geostrategic defeat that is looming for the Western political class should hopefully be an opportunity and a reason to again take into account the wisdom of Clausewitz. A new peaceful foreign policy must be constructed almost from scratch in the USA and Western Europe, built exclusively on the principle of defense, with war being the instrument of last resort not just in word but also in deed.
[i] C. Quigley, Tragedy and Hope, p827. (1966)
[ii] G. Santayana, Reason in Society (1905).